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Abstract 
In computational cognitive science, many cognitive processes 
seem to be successfully modeled as Bayesian computations. 
Yet, many such Bayesian computations has been proven to be 
computationally intractable (NP-hard) for unconstrained input 
domains, even if only an approximate solution is sought. This 
computational complexity result seems to be in strong 
contrast with the ease and speed with which humans can 
typically make the inferences that are modeled by Bayesian 
models. This contrast—between theory and practice—poses a 
considerable theoretical challenge for computational cognitive 
modelers: How can intractable Bayesian computations be 
transformed into computationally plausible `approximate’ 
models of human cognition? In this paper, three candidate 
notions of ‘approximation’ are discussed, each of which has 
been suggested in the cognitive science literature. We will 
sketch how (parameterized) computational complexity 
analyses can yield model variants that are tractable and which 
can serve as the basis of computationally plausible models of 
cognition. 
Keywords: Bayesian inference; approximation, NP-hard; 
parameterized complexity theory, algorithms, computational 
explanation. 
Introduction 
Over the last decade, Bayesian modeling has become more 
and more important as a modeling framework in cognitive 
science. Many of such Bayesian models postulate that 
cognitive processes perform some form of Bayesian 
inference.1 Examples of such models can be found in 
several different cognitive domains, including vision (Yuille 
& Kersten, 2006), language (Chater & Manning, 2006), 
decision making (Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006), motor 
planning (Wolpert & Ghrahamani, 2005), eye movement 
control (Engbert & Krügel, 2010), and theory of mind 
(Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009; Cuijpers et al., 2006). 
These models often perform well at describing and 
predicting human behavior on small, well-structured 
experimental tasks. For instance, Bayesian models have 
                                                          
1 We will use the term ‘Bayesian inference’ to denote all sorts of 
computations using Bayesian models, like computing posterior 
probabilities and finding most probable explanations, as is 
common in the literature; we do not restrict this term to refer to the 
formal INFERENCE problem in Bayesian networks. 
been able to succesfully model human inferences about an 
agent’s goal in a maze-like structure given the trajectory up 
so far (Baker et al., 2009) and predicting the most likely 
next action of a co-worker in a joint action task based on 
observed movements (Cuijpers et al., 2006). When 
confronted with task situations of real-world complexity, 
however, it is not evident if and how these models could 
scale up. The reason is that Bayesian computations are 
known to be computationally intractable (i.e., NP-hard) for 
unconstrained domains (Cooper, 1990; Shimony, 1994; Park 
& Darwiche, 2004; Kwisthout, 2009; Kwisthout, 2011). 
Informally, this means that the postulated computations 
would simply require an unrealistic amount of time for all 
but small inputs if they are to operate in unconstrained 
domains (van Rooij, 2008). 
The known NP-hardness of (unconstrained) Bayesian 
models of cognition implies that such models cannot serve 
as computationally and psychologically plausible 
explanations of the tasks and processes which they model. 
Cognitive modelers using a Bayesian approach are thus 
confronted with a tractability paradox: humans seem 
capable of performing well in situations of real-world 
complexity in little time and with apparently little effort; 
yet, our best computational cognitive models consume an 
unrealistic amount of time or other cognitive resources for 
all but overly simplified toy domains. This paradox has been 
recognized by both opponents and proponents of Bayesian 
models, and has led to considerable debate about whether or 
not the human mind/brain performs such (rational) 
probabilistic computations (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & 
Goldstein, 2008; Sanborn et al., 2010; Kruschke, 2010).  
A common response from proponents of Bayesian models 
of cognition has been that the tractability paradox is caused 
by a mistaken assumption, viz., the assumption that 
Bayesian models necessarily aim to be exact models of how 
human minds/brains form explanations. Instead, so these 
researchers argue, the models postulate computations that 
humans compute approximately.  For instance, the mind 
may approximate Bayesian computations by employing 
heuristics, by sampling, or by striving for merely 
satisfactory solutions rather than optimal solutions (Chater 
et al., 2006; Sanborn et al., 2010). 
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Notwithstanding the appeal and apparent plausibility of 
this perspective, this standard response can at best be only 
part of the solution to the intractability paradox (Kwisthout, 
Wareham, & Van Rooij, 2011). The reason is that most—if 
not all—forms of approximating Bayesian inference are for 
unconstrained input domains as computationally intractable 
as computing Bayesian inference exactly.  For instance, 
even though empirical results suggest that in certain specific 
situations a few samples are sufficient to draw reasonable 
conclusions from a probability distribution (Vul, Goodman, 
Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2009); making decisions based on 
a ‘majority vote’ using samples remains provably 
intractable for general input domains (Kwisthout, 2010). 
Similarly, while approximate inference algorithms 
sometimes can perform well in practice (Park, 2002), 
approximating or “satisficing” Bayesian inference remains 
intractable for general domains (Abdelbar & Hedetniemi, 
1998; Kwisthout, 2011; Park et al., 2004; Roth, 1996). 
The upshot of such negative computational complexity 
results for approximating Bayesian inference is that the 
assumption of ‘approximation’ by itself is insufficient to 
explain how Bayesian models can scale to situations of real-
world complexity; and in effect, such models cannot yet 
claim computational plausibility as explanations of how 
humans make (Bayesian) inferences in everyday life  
(Kwisthout et al., 2011). Furthermore, by overlooking and 
not explicating the intrinsic complexity of approximating 
Bayesian inferences for certain situations, one may actually 
miss an opportunity to predict and explain under which 
circumstances humans inference can and does approximate 
optimal Bayesian inference and under which conditions it 
cannot and does not. 
An alternative approach to tackle this intractability 
paradox is to study how the complexity of computations 
depends specifically on situational constraints. This 
approach draws among other things on the concepts and 
techniques from the mathematical theory of parameterized 
complexity theory (Downey & Fellows, 1999). Here, 
situational constraints are modeled by parameters k1, k2 … 
km, where each k is a property of the input. For instance, a 
Bayesian network may have many parameters, such as the 
number of cycles in the network, the maximum number of 
parents for any given node, the maximum length of a path 
between any two given nodes, the treewidth2 of the network, 
etc.  
 It is known that certain NP-hard computations can be 
tractable for bounded ranges of such parameters. This is the 
case, for instance, if inferences can be computed in a time 
that grows non-polynomially only in the parameters and 
polynomial in the rest of the input size. In such situations 
the computations can be performed fast, even for very large 
inputs, provided only that the parameters take on small 
values in those large inputs. If similar parameterized 
                                                          
2 Treewidth is a graph-theoretical concept that can loosely be 
described as a measure on the “localness” of connections in a 
graph. We refer the reader to, for instance, Bodlaender (2006) for a 
formal definition and more details. 
tractability results can be obtained for Bayesian models of 
cognition, this means that the models predict that humans 
can make fast inferences in situations that are modeled by 
inputs with the same bounded parameter ranges.  
This approach has previously been used to successfully 
identify situational constraints (modeled by parameter 
ranges) that yield tractability for both Bayesian and non-
Bayesian models of cognition in a variety of domains, such 
as: analogy (van Rooij et al., 2008), problem solving 
(Wareham, Evans, & van Rooij, 2011), similarity (Müller, 
van Rooij, & Wareham, 2009), action understanding 
(Blokpoel, Kwisthout, van der Weide, & van Rooij, 2010), 
and communication (van Rooij et al., 2011). For example, 
based on known parameterized complexity results on 
abduction in Bayesian networks (Bodlaender, van den 
Eijkhof, & Van der Gaag, 2002), van Rooij et al. (2011) 
derived that the inference made by an addressee to 
understand a communicator’s intention—as modeled by a 
Bayesian model—is tractable when the probability of the 
most probable goal is relatively high and the sender has few 
(instrumental) goals other than her communicative goals.  
Until now, the parameterized complexity approach to 
dealing with intractability of cognitive models has focused 
on exact computations. Little research has been done, for 
instance, on the parameterized complexity of approximate 
Bayesian computations. Even the term ‘approximation’ 
appears to be often ill-defined. Take, for instance, again 
Bayesian abduction (computing the most probable 
explanation h out of a set of candidate explanations H, given 
a number of observations e, i.e., computing h such that 
Pr(H = h | e) is maximal). In the context of such a model 
‘approximation’ could refer to finding explanations that are 
‘almost as likely as’, ‘are similar to’, or ‘are likely to be’ the 
most probable explanation. Such ambiguity of the meaning 
of ‘approximation’ can lead to confusion and 
misunderstanding, as well as unsubstantiated claims of 
tractable approximability. In this paper, we aim to explicate 
various notions of approximate Bayesian inference in an 
attempt to support a more thorough study of the 
approximability of Bayesian computations as featured in 
models of cognition. Additionally, we illustrate how an 
approximation approach and the parameterized complexity 
approach can be combined to identify the situational 
constraints that render Bayesian models tractably 
approximable.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We 
will start by defining three distinct notions of 
approximation. Next, we will present a case study to 
illustrate the utility of the proposed combined approach for 
one of these three notions of approximation. The conclusion 
of our illustration will be that approximation is neither 
panacea nor placebo: it is not a ‘magical ingredient’ that 
makes intractable computations tractable by default. Yet, it 
may be a ‘necessary ingredient’ for achieving tractability 
under certain constraints. Finally, we conclude by 
discussing the broader implications of our case study and 
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observations for dealing with the tractability paradox in 
Bayesian modeling in general.   
Notions of approximation 
In everyday language, the concept ‘roughly’ is widely 
used: The ratio between the circumference and diameter of a 
circle is roughly 3.14; the Sun is roughly 100 times as large 
(and also 100 times as distant from the Earth) as the Moon; 
there is a mountain range on Mars that looks roughly like a 
human face. We save a lot of effort if we don’t compute 98 
times 102 exactly, but compute it as ‘roughly 100 times 100 
= 10,000.’ When we come to see approximation as a 
synonym to roughly computed, in the above-sketched 
informal sense, the term has a pleasant association with 
‘fast’, ‘easy’, and ‘without much effort’. 
In computer science, however, there is a great variety on 
how fast and how well approximation algorithms perform 
for problems that are intractable to compute exactly. For 
example, the knapsack problem—in which one is to select a 
subset of numbers from a set of numbers so that the subset 
adds up to some pre-specified value—can be approximated 
within any desired guaranteed error margin in an amount of 
time that is polynomially bounded both in the input size and 
the error (Kellerer & Pferschy, 1999). In contrast, the 
maximum clique problem cannot be approximated at all in 
polynomial time, under the common assumption that P ≠ NP 
(Zuckerman, 2006). In these classic results in computer 
science, approximations are defined as solutions that have a 
value that is close to the optimal solution, i.e., the 
approximated value is within a given ratio of the value of 
the optimal solution. However, an approximation may also 
be defined as a solution that has a structure that is similar to 
the structure of the optimal solution, regardless of its value 
(van Rooij & Wareham, under review). The important 
difference between these forms of approximation can be 
understood as follows: a value-approximation of the 
Bayesian abduction problem can be an explanation (i.e., a 
value assignment to H) that is only slightly less probable 
than the most probable solution, but does not resemble that 
optimal solution. Conversely, a structure-approximation 
may be an explanation that looks a lot like the most 
probable explanation, but its probability may be much lower 
and need not even be close to optimal. Lastly, we may see 
approximations as solutions that are likely to be the optimal 
solution, but allow for a small margin of expected error. 
This type of approximation is common for probabilistic 
algorithms that are very useful for solving a certain class of 
problems (e.g., primality testing), as they are much faster 
than deterministic algorithms yet allow the possibility of 
error (Motwani & Raghavan, 1995). We will denote the 
latter notion of approximation as expectation-
approximation. Note that a ‘good’ value-approximation 
does not imply a ‘good’ structure- or expectation-
approximation, or vice versa (see Figure 1). 
When invoking ‘approximation’ as an explanatory tool, 
cognitive modelers may utilize many (combinations of) 
these notions of approximation. For example, models may 
postulate that cognitive processes compute an 
approximation that resembles the optimal solution for a 
Bayesian inference problem as well as have an almost-as-
high probability value (Chater & Oaksford, 1999). 
Combinations of value-approximation and expectation-
approximation are also common in, e.g., the well-known 
PAC-learning framework (Valiant, 1984) for machine 
learning. Consistent with the positions argued by Kwisthout 
et al. (2011, p. 780) and van Rooij & Wareham (under 
review) we submit that any claim that Bayesian models are 
“tractable due to approximation” should be supported by: 
(a) a precise definition of the notion of approximation the 
modeler assumes to be used; (b) in the case that the (formal) 
approximation problem in itself is NP-hard, a set of problem 
parameters that the modeler believes to be constrained in 
real-world situations (where humans perform the task well); 
(c) a formal proof that the chosen formal definition of the 
assumed approximation becomes tractable when the values 
of these parameters are so constrained; and (d) arguments or 
evidence that support the assumption in (b). 
We will next illustrate with a case study how (a), (b), (c) 
and (d) can be implemented for Bayesian models using 
formal theoretical methods.  
Case study: Most Simple Explanations 
A common computational problem in Bayesian networks 
is inferring the best explanation out of a set of possible 
hypotheses, given some observations that are entered as 
evidence in the network. In such a network, the set of 
variables is typically partitioned into explanation variables 
(for which an explanation is sought), evidence variables 
(whose value is observed), and intermediate variables (that 
are neither observed, nor to be explained). This partition 
corresponds to the assumption that there are (many) 
variables that influence the resulting most probable 
hypothesis, but are not themselves observed. One way of 
dealing with such intermediate variables was proposed by 
Figure 1: (left) The most probable value assignment for V1 to V4 (denoted by the light- middle- and dark-grey colors); 
(middle) an approximation that resembles the most probable value assignment but may have a much lower probability; 
(right) an approximation that may have an almost-as-high probability as, but does not resemble, the most probable value 
assignment 
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Kwisthout (2010). Therein, the MOST SIMPLE EXPLANATION 
problem was defined as follows:  
MOST SIMPLE EXPLANATION (informal) 
Input: A probabilistic network, partitioned into a set of 
observed evidence nodes, an explanation set, and a set 
of intermediate variables. 
Output: The joint value assignment to the explanation 
set that is the most probable explanation for the 
maximal number of instantiations of the intermediate 
variables. 
 
Or more formally stated: 
 
MOST SIMPLE EXPLANATION (formal) 
Input: A probabilistic network B, partitioned into a set 
of evidence nodes E with a joint value assignment e, an 
explanation set H, and intermediate variables I. 
Output: The joint value assignment h for which 
argmaxH Pr(H, I = i, e) = h holds for the largest number 
of joint value i assignments to I. 
 
Intuitively, one can think of MSE as the computational 
problem of finding the explanation that is most probable in 
the majority of possible worlds. Solving the MSE problem 
is, like many other computational problems defined over 
Bayesian networks, known to be intractable.3 Given this 
unfavorable complexity result, can MSE still serve as an 
adequate approximate model of abduction by humans in 
real-world situations? Using the four requirements 
introduced in the previous section we will show that the 
answer is yes: one can define an expectation-approximation 
algorithm for MSE that is tractable under conditions that 
seem to be met for human abduction. 
a) Give a precise definition of the notion of 
approximation that is used. We use the following 
expectation-approximation to MSE, i.e., rather than exactly 
computing the solution to MSE, we want a solution that is 
very likely to be the MSE, but allows for a (guaranteed to 
be) small probability of error In principle, such an 
expectation-approximation could be computed for MSE 
using a sampling algorithm that samples N random joint 
value assignments to I and casts a majority vote over the 
                                                          
3 In fact, it is NPPP-hard and thus resides in the same complexity 
class as, e.g., the MAP (Park & Darwiche, 2004) and Parameter 
Tuning (Kwisthout & van der Gaag, 2008) problems in Bayesian 
Networks. 
samples.  Moreover, using the so-called Chernoff bound 
(Chernoff, 1952) it can be exactly computed how many 
samples are required to expectation-approximate MSE to a 
given threshold probability. Alas, it is not possible to 
tractably expectation-approximate MSE, because the 
number of samples that are needed for a given degree of 
expectation-approximation can be exponential in the size of 
I.  
b) As the chosen approximation is intractable in general, 
we define problem parameters that we hypothesize to be 
constrained in the ‘real world’ situations that the model 
should capture. A closer look at the MSE problem will 
reveal many problem parameters on the probability 
distribution and on the structure of the network. We look at 
three of them more closely:  
 
1. The treewidth of a Bayesian network is a measure on 
the network structure. A formal definition of treewidth is 
mathematically non-trivial (see, e.g., Bodlaender, 2006, 
for details), but for our purposes it suffices to say that 
typically, if treewidth is low, the connections tend to be 
fairly local in the network. See Figure 2 for an illustrative 
example of this property.  
 
2. The cardinality of a Bayesian network indicates the 
maximum number of values any variable can take; in 
binary variables the cardinality is two, but in principle 
variables can take many values. 
 
3. The relevancy of the set of intermediate variables is a 
measure on the probability distribution in the network, and 
is defined as the probability that two random samples i1 
and i2 would yield different most probable explanations. 
Informally, the intermediate variables have a low 
relevancy when there are only few possible worlds in 
which the most probable explanation deviates from the 
most probable explanation in the majority of worlds.  
 
c) Give a formal proof that expectation-approximation of 
MSE becomes tractable when the values of these parameters 
are constrained. It can be shown that if both the cardinality 
and the treewidth of the network are small, and in addition 
the intermediate variables have a low relevancy, then having 
only a few samples already suffices to solve the MSE with a 
low margin of error. Consider the following algorithm from 
Kwisthout (2010): 
 
Figure 2: A network with low (left) and high (right) treewidth. Note that there is only a single connection 
between the clusters A,B,C and D,E,F in the left picture, whereas the connections in the right picture are much 
more scattered over the whole network. 
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for n = 1 to N do 
 Choose i at random 
 Determine h = argmaxH Pr(H, i, e) 
 Count the joint value assignments (h, i) 
end for 
Decide upon the majority and output hmaj 
 
Computing argmaxH Pr(H, i, e) can be done in time O(ctw ⋅ 
n), where c denotes the cardinality of the network, tw the 
treewidth of the network, and n the number of variables of 
the network (Shimony, 1994). Also, according to the 
Chernoff bound, the number of samples N depends—for a 
fixed error rate—only on the probability that a randomly 
chosen sample actually is one of these possible worlds for 
which hmaj is the most probable explanation (i.e., depends 
only on the relevancy measure R) such that less samples are 
needed if this probability is high. We conclude that, for 
small c small tw, and R close to 0, this algorithm tractably 
expectation-approximates the MSE problem. 
d) Support the hypothesized constraints in b) with 
arguments or empirical findings. The most contributing 
factor in the running time of computing argmaxH Pr(H, i, e)  
is the treewidth of the network, as it is in the exponent. 
There is evidence in the machine learning literature (see e.g. 
Koller & Friedman, 2009) that bounding treewidth while 
learning Bayesian networks from data prevents overfitting 
of the network. As there is reason to believe human learning 
tends to prevent overfitting as well, the same principles may 
yield bounded treewidth for human belief networks.  A 
second important factor in the running time is the relevancy 
of intermediate variables, i.e., the number of samples 
required to compute the MSE with low probability of error. 
While we are unaware of studies that empirically confirm 
that relevancy for human belief networks is low (i.e., 
number of required samples is small), there is independent 
theoretical research (e.g., Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006; 
Vul et al., 2009) pointing in this direction,  
Conclusion 
Bayesian models of cognition are evidently successful in 
describing and predicting many cognitive phenomena. 
Despite this success, one important theoretical challenge 
remains to date: The tractability paradox, i.e., the apparent 
conflict between the computational intractability of 
Bayesian models for general input domains on the one hand, 
and the ease and speed with which human perform the 
modeled tasks in situations of real-world complexity on the 
other. Often, the paradox is attempted to be solved by 
claiming that minds/brains approximate, rather than exactly 
compute, the modeled inference problems. While we agree 
that approximation may be part of a solution, claims of 
‘approximability’ alone are in the end explanatorily 
unsatisfactory as they are typically too ill-defined and 
sometimes even provably contradicted by known 
complexity results (Kwisthout et al., 2011). 
In this paper we presented a method for solving the 
tractability paradox. Importantly, our method does not solve 
in one go the paradox for all Bayesian models. This is 
currently not possible, and may even be impossible in 
principle. Instead, our method describes how conditions for 
tractability can be studied and identified for different 
Bayesian models case by case. Crucial steps in our method 
are the following. First, one needs to decide on a relevant 
formal notion of approximation for the respective model. 
Here, we have discussed three such possible formal 
notions—viz., value-, structure-, and expectation-
approximation—but altogether different notions or any 
combination of these are possible to adopt in our 
methodology well. Second, using techniques from 
computational complexity theory one investigates under 
which conditions the respective model can be tractably 
approximated in the respective sense. Last, if there are good 
reasons to believe that the identified tractability conditions 
are met in those situations where humans can perform the 
modeled inferences quickly, the analysis has solved the 
tractability paradox for this specific Bayesian model. 
We illustrated the use of our methodology for a specific 
Bayesian model: MSE (which stands for ‘Most Simple 
Explanation’). We found that MSE is intractable to 
expectation-approximate for unconstrained Bayesian 
networks, but is tractable to expectation-approximate for 
networks of bounded treewidth and with few relevant 
intermediate variables. Importantly, MSE is intractable to 
compute exactly under those same conditions. This set of 
results underscores our idea that approximation is not a 
panacea (approximation is not enough to yield tractability 
for all domains), but it is not a placebo either (it plays a 
necessary role in yielding tractability in certain conditions). 
We believe that by systematically studying this interplay 
between approximation and constraints on input domains 
for more Bayesian models, these models can achieve higher 
levels of computational plausibility, and at the same time 
serve as computational-level explanations of when and why 
humans are good at making the rational inferences 
postulated by these models, and when not.  
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